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4. Due's Lecture: 
a. Due Biography 
• 
• 
Due Biography 1st draft 
Ole Due was born on February 10, 1931. Due received his law 
degree from the University of Copenhagen in 1955, and in the same 
year, took up a post at Denmark's Ministry of Justice. In the 
years that followed, Ole Due worked in national service and was 
ultimately able to serve all of the European Community, as 
President of the Court of Justice. Like John Sonnett, Due devoted 
many of his early professional years to service of his country. At 
the Ministry of Justice, Due steadily worked his way to important 
positions of responsibility. In 1970, he became Head of Division 
and was made Director of the Ministry of Justice some five years 
later. 
From 1964 to 1973, Due was Head of Course and Lecturer for 
post-graduate courses in Community Law at the Danish Legal Society, 
the Danish Civil Service Administration College, and the Council of 
Lawyers. From 1964 to 1976, he served as a member of the Danish 
delegation at the Hague Conference on Private International Law. 
Due served for many years as both Secretary and then President of 
the Commission on the Adaptation of Laws Prior to the Accession of 
Denmark to the European Communities. From 1970 to 1972, Due served 
as a Permanent Delegate to the conferences on the technical 
adjustments to be made to Community measures in view of the 
enlargement of the Communities and on drafting legal provisions in 
the Treaty of Accession. 
Due was Editor of the Community Law Index from 1973 to 1975, 
and has published numerous articles on European Community Law, 
• legal practice and private international law. He is co-editor and 
• 
• 
author of the Danish Community Law Reports. He is an Honorary 
Bencher of both Gray's Inn, London and King's Inns, Dublin. 
On October 7, 1979, Due became a judge at the Court of Justice 
of the European Communities. The Court of Justice has powers to 
oversee the interpretation and application of European Economic 
Community laws. On October 7, 1988, Due became President of the 
Court of Justice • 
b. Due Introduction 
•• 
• 
• 
• 
Due Introduction 4th draft w/ JDF changes 
The year 1992 marked the official beginning of the European 
Economic Community and a different era for Europe. After over 
three millennia of constant political conflict, Europe was to begin 
knocking down its borders -- at least economically. As an economic 
entity, a single Europe would pose a formidable presence in a new 
world order. The emergence of Japan as a world economic power has 
shown how a nation can gain political clout with a strong economy 
rather than with a devastating arsenal of weaponry. 
With respect to the legal framework of the EEC, the judiciary 
branch is called the European Court of Justice. The Court of 
Justice interprets the articles of the Treaty of Rome and 
determines whether the economic harmonization legislation passed by 
the European Council, the EEC's legislative body, is followed by 
each member state. In order to harmonize the laws of so many 
different countries, the European Council issues directives that 
require each member state to comply with a specific area of law 
harmonization, be it banking, labor, or securities law. While the 
sovereignty and foreign policy of each EEC member state are not 
preempted by the EEC, any economic legislation such as quantitative 
measures and customs duties passed by a member state is subject to 
review and rescission by the Court of Justice. 
In many ways, the Court of Justice is a distant cousin of the 
United States Supreme Court. While its American counterpart is 
guided by and interprets the concepts of the United States 
Constitution, the Court of Justice interprets the various articles 
• of the Treaty of Rome which formalized the concept of a Europe 
• 
• 
without economic borders. Since that document provides the 
foundation for the existence and the future of the new European 
economic entity, interpreting its articles incorporates similar 
responsibilities. The final decision of the Court of Justice will 
affect each and every member state. Unlike the United States, 
Europe's legal systems are not as homogeneous as those of the fifty 
American states. In this context, the Court of Justice may very 
easily overreach its discretion. The Honorable Ole Due, current 
President of the European Court of Justice, discussed these issues 
in his Sennett Lecture. 
Judicial activism by the high court is as much an issue in 
Europe as it is in the United States. Unlike the Supreme Court, 
the European Court of Justice is not grappling with such 
controversial social issues as abortion and privacy rights • 
Instead, the European Court of Justice tackles highly contested 
economic issues. The tension in the new Europe arises because the 
EEC consists of many nations with vastly different social, economic 
and cultural backgrounds. Because each directive issued by the 
European Council represents a compromise between these different 
nations, some nations will have to change their way of life somehow 
to achieve harmonization. Thus, there is a genuine concern for 
judicial activism which Ole Due addressed in his lecture at Fordham 
Law School • 
-· 
• 
c. Lecture by Bon. Ole Due, "Legal Remedies Against 
the Council's Failure to Act" 
• 
ADDRESS 
LEGAL REMEDIES FOR THE FAILURE OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS 
TO ACT IN CONFORMITY WITH EEC TREATY PROVISIONS! 
Ole Duett 
Any discussion of the case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities (the ""Court'' or the ""Court of Justice'') 
will sooner or later touch upon what is commonly called the 
judicial activism of the Court. 
A European Community Member State lawyer's attitude towards 
judicial activism normally depends on the relations between the 
judicial and legislative powers within his country. This 
relationship varies from Member State to Member State, ranging from 
the very cautious approach of the French and Danish courts to the 
extensive control exercised by the German court, the 
• ""Bundesverfassungsgericht.'' As expected, the Court of Justice 
has placed itself somewhere in the middle of these extremes. 
• 
A U.S. lawyer will normally try to compare the case law of the 
Court of Justice with that of the U.S. Supreme Court, trying to 
distinguish between periods in which the tendency to promote 
integration has been more or less pronounced. Indeed, the Court of 
Justice's activism and role as intermediary between legislative and 
executive arms of the European Economic Community (the ""EEC'' or 
the ""Community'') and between national authorities and the 
institutions of the Community has led some to compare the Court to 
the U.S. Supreme Court under Chief Justice Marshall. 
In fact, differences in the Court's jurisprudence may be 
observed over time • However, contrary to the situation in the 
United States, developments in the Court's jurisprudence are 
• 
• 
difficult to relate to changes in its composition. While in the 
United States, it is perfectly acceptable for the executive branch 
to seek to influence future case law by making appointments to the 
federal courts, this is less common in the Member States of the 
EEC. I am not aware of any nomination to the Court of Justice 
aimed at changing the Court's attitude towards European 
integration. 
Therefore, the different trends in the case law of the Court 
of Justice should probably be seen more as reactions to changes in 
the political environment. In periods where centrifugal tendencies 
have dominated the political scene, the Court has tried to defend 
treaty objectives against such tendencies. In certain periods, the 
political institutions, first and foremost the Council of Ministers 
of the European Communities (the ""Council''), have found it hard 
to live up to the aims of the treaties, whether because of the need 
for unanimity in a decision of the Council or because of the 
political currents in some of the major Member States. During 
these periods, we may find a tendency to compensate for this lack 
of legislative activity by basing Court decisions directly on the 
treaty provisions. On the other hand, during periods of great 
political activity aimed at a strengthening of the Community, we 
may find the Court of Justice more reluctant to commit itself. 
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• 
the Court 
has no right to take initiatives itself. It must confine itself to 
dealing with the cases brought before it. It is thus up to the 
plaintiff to select the weapon that will best achieve the sought 
after objectives by way of the legal procedure used. 
It is, however, clear that by means of its case law the Court 
has an important influence on that choice. By accepting a certain 
form of legal procedure as the appropriate form to achieve the 
plaintiff's objective, the Court can sharpen the weapon so that the 
procedure constitutes an attractive choice for future plaintiffs. 
Conversely, the Court can limit the effectiveness of a form of 
legal procedure so that recourse to that weapon will be made only 
when no other is available. It is this interplay between the 
plaintiff and the Court that I wish to examine • 
My examination will be confined essentially to the legal 
remedies employed against the Council's inaction. However, since 
the Council consists of representatives of the Member States, I 
shall to some extent have to look also at the inaction of the 
Member States themselves. 
I shall, moreover, confine myself to the EEC and its governing 
instrument, the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community 
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The EEC Treaty appears to indicate that the best weapon for 
confronting inaction should be the action for failure to act. 4 
Apparently, this type of action constitutes the proper means of 
forcing the institution in question to fulfil its duty to act. 
Experience shows, however, that quite different weapons have been 
effective. 
The most important innovation in the section of the EEC Treaty 
that deals with the Court is Article 177. 5 This rule deals with 
the right, and in certain cases, the duty, of national courts to 
ref er questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling on the 
interpretation and validity of Community rules. The aim of the 
provision is to ensure uniform interpretation and application of 
Community law in the Member States, but it has proven to offer 
other ossibilities, es eciall [as a] [ii'""".t he'""'iriif'"W!th'''·whld'h"''''Wi. p p Y »»>x<0:'.':"x'"'"'""~;;:""""'·:«·>x·:·:·:";::;::< ....... ,,.;:;::<·:·:·:·:::::-.·:<<-x:x<-:·x':':":<':·:·:":'·:«::::<~:<-
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part of the Member States and the organs of the Community[. Jfflii.fi 
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The process has involved several stages. First, the Court 
recognized that Community rules which impose clear and 
unconditional duties on the Member States create rights in favor of 
citizens and undertakings which they can rely on before national 
~ courts (direct effect).' Subsequently, the Court mandated that 
• 
such Community rules oblige the authorities of the Member States to 
set aside any conflicting national provisions (precedence of 
Community law). 7 Finally, the Court emphasized that a decision on 
the relevance of a preliminary ruling to a case pending before the 
national court is to be left to that national court. Such a 
decision cannot be challenged by the Member States or the EEC 
institutions in their observations before the Court of Justice.• 
Thus hardened and sharpened, the preliminary ruling procedure 
became an effective weapon for the enforcement of the Treaty's 
standstill provisions.' Subsequently, the procedure was useful in 
attaining the free movement of goods, persons, and services by the 
end of the transitional period on January 1, 1970, although some 
implementing provisions had still not been adopted by the 
Council. 1° Finally, the preliminary ruling procedure gave effect 
to clear directive provisions that had not been correctly 
transposed into national law within the mandated time. 11 
In a broad range of circumstances, the case law of the Court 
under Article 177 has led simply to the relinquishment, by the 
Commission, of legislative initiatives as superfluous after a 
decision by the Court. Such was the case with the implementing 
provisions in the spheres of establishment and services that had 
yet to be adopted at the end of the transitional period. It was 
also the direct conclusion drawn by the Commission after the 
so-called ""Cassis de Dijon' ' line of cases, 12 developed by the 
Court on the basis of references for a preliminary ruling. The 
Commission concluded from that case law that as a principal and 
• overriding rule, it was a breach of the prohibition in Article 30 
• 
of the Treaty to limit, for technical or commercial reasons, the 
marketing in its territory of goods that were lawfully produced and 
marketed in another Member State. 13 That view led temporarily to 
an almost complete halt to the Commission's legislative initiatives 
with regard to the harmonization of the technical requirements of 
the Member States with respect to goods. The Commission was 
clearly convinced that traders would presumably know how to avail 
themselves of the means offered by the Court in order to remove 
such obstacles to trade. 
Although the preliminary ruling procedure is an effective 
weapon against failure to act, its aim is not very accurate. It 
can be used to demolish barriers in the form of national 
provisions, but not to build up common rules, however desirable 
those rules might be. Fortunately, the Commission has now embarked 
on a more balanced harmonizing policy, and the Single European 
Actu has created a legal basis that appears to provide an 
appropriate foundation for such a policy. 
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As a rule, fu:ff81t~£f.:A the application of Article 177 is limited 
to cases where there are clear and unconditional duties of 
abstention or action. Admittedly, national courts are increasingly 
referring questions regarding the proper interpretation of a 
directive to the Court of Justice, on the assumption that the 
national legislature has intended to implement the directive 
correctly. Thus, the Article 177 procedure acquires a 
significance, independent of any direct effect the Community 
provision might have. However, this development has thus far been 
primarily limited to the national courts• application of national 
provisions that are designed to implement a specific directive. 
The private person• s participation in bringing Community 
institutions• inactivity to an end thus remains, generally 
speaking, subject to the relevant Community provision being clear 
and unconditional. 
Instead of referring to the private pe.rson • s ""participation•• 
it would perhaps be more correct if I spoke of the private person's 
""initiative.•• In Article 177 cases, the Commission always avails 
• itself of the right accorded to the institutions and Member States 
• 
• 
to submit written observations, and the Commission always appears 
at the hearings. By means of its observations and pleadings, the 
Commission has made a decisive contribution to molding the 
preliminary ruling procedure into an appropriate weapon against the 
inactivity of the Council. A recent example of the Commission's 
activity involved a reference for a preliminary ruling intended to 
clarify whether the Netherlands' rules on value-added tax (""VAT'') 
on trade in second-hand goods were compatible with Community law. 
Pursuant to article 32 of the Sixth VAT Directive, 17 the Member 
States should have adopted common rules in that area by the end of 
1977. In its written observations before the Court, the Commission 
argued that national rules which deviated from the VAT system's 
prohibition of principle against double taxation should now be 
regarded as a breach of Community law. The Commission argued that 
such a finding should be regarded as a consequence of more than ten 
years' inactivity in the VAT area. In that case the Court did not 
agree with the Commission. 18 Notably, that case concerned a VAT 
on trade in second-hand goods within a single Member State and thus 
did not bear upon obstacles to trade between Member States. In an 
earlier decision, 19 the Court had held that Article 95 of the EEC 
Treaty20 obliged the Member States to deduct the residual part of 
the VAT21 when levying a VAT on the importation by a private person 
of second-hand goods. Thus, the Court went further than the 
Commission had suggested. The Court thereby brought about a 
legislative initiative on the Commission's part concerning the 
establishment of more detailed rules in respect of such deduction • 
In addition to its contribution to Article 177 cases, the 
• 
Commission has another effective weapon at its disposal, namely an 
action against the Member States for infringement of the Treaty 
pursuant to Article 169. 22 It is quite clear thatVthit [this) form t:::::·:·:;;:~;.»-;:;.:;:::;:;::; 
of procedure is a suitable means of putting an end to a Member 
State's inactivity. It is, however, surprising that it is also 
effective in reactivating a Commission proposal that has run 
aground in the Council . 1_1~::m~t.§:ii:ti::r~s:a~l~P:.~!i§f'.~I%n~~r209l 
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The cases on the taxation of alcoholic beverages, 2 3 like the 
case on the light tax on Danish fruit wine, 24 formed part of an 
attempt on the part of the Commission to arouse the Member States' 
interest in adopting the Commission's proposals for the 
harmonization of tax on alcoholic beverages. By obtaining a ruling 
that the existing taxation system in a number of Member States was 
protectionist and therefore in breach of Article 95 of the Treaty, 
the Commission hoped to remove the main cause of the Member States' 
resistance to tax harmonization in the area of alcoholic beverages. 
The attempt was successful inasmuch as in most cases the Court 
upheld the Commission's argument that the national tax system 
favored national beverages in a way that infringed Article 95. 
However, the Commission did not achieve its main objective. Even 
if some national systems are weighted in favor of their national 
products, they are primarily part of a general taxation policy 
pursuing fiscal and health ends which do not per se infringe 
Community law. The Commission therefore also had to include the 
• area of alcoholic beverages in its general program for tax 
• 
• 
harmonization in preparation for the completion of the internal EEC 
market in 1992. 
An additional reason for the Commission's lack of success in 
the series of cases dealing with tax harmonization of alcoholic 
beverages was the Court's observance of the delineation of tasks 
between the legislature and the judiciary. In the case against the 
United Kingdom concerning the relationship between wine and beer 
taxation, 25 the Commission had hoped to force the Court to choose 
one of the criteria that the parties had suggested (tax calculation 
based on either volume, alcoholic strength, or pre-tax price). The 
Court, however, left the choice between those criteria to the 
legislature and confined itself to a finding that the wine was too 
heavily taxed regardless of the criterion applied • 
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An Article 169 action is especially effective against failure 
by the Council to act in areas where it is necessary to create new 
• 
• 
rules but where the Community alone has competence. For example, 
as a consequence of lack of unanimity in the allocation of fishing 
quotas, the Member States sought, in the late 1970s, to protect the 
disappearing fishery resources by means of national rules. The 
Court, however, held that competence had irrevocably passed to the 
Community and the Member States could therefore act solely as 
negotiorum gestores27 and then only with the Commission• s 
consent. 28 On the other hand, the Court has not until now accepted 
the notion that in such a situation the Commission can, on grounds 
comparable to necessity, exercise the power conferred by the Treaty 
on a paralyzed Council. 29 
A third form of procedure which has been used successfully by 
the Commission to prevent blocking in the Council is the action for 
annulment under Article 17 3 of the EEC Treaty. 30@:J:\t:Q1]{~:ggJI:jii§::i!§!ii))~Ill 
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That form of procedure has, however, been used by the 
Commission primarily as a weapon against the Council's tendency to 
base a legal measure on a provision of the Treaty that requires 
unanimity rather than on a provision that merely requires a 
qualified majority. 32 In such cases, the Commission has generally 
not objected to the substance of the rules adopted. Rather, its 
challenge to the legal measure has been aimed solely at precluding 
• any future blocking in the Council of the matter. The Court has 
• 
• 
admitted this type of action • 
As is well known, the Single European Act has made it possible 
for the Council to adopt more decisions by a qualified majority. 
It hasi;[[jlfi"§~i£:~',£J also conferred new powers on the Community, for 
example in environmental matters, where unanimity is required. 
There is consequently little chance that the Court will, in the 
near future, be able to avoid these cases, which often appear very 
formalistic but can have considerable impact on the balance of 
power between the institutions. 
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It is clear from the text of the EEC Treaty that an action for 
failure to act brought by an undertaking or a private person 
against the Council is unlikely to be admissible. Under the third 
paragraph of Article 175, natural or legal persons may only 
complain in the case of a failure to address an act ""to that 
person.'' 33 Apart from its relationship to its servants, the 
Council does not issue acts addressed to individual persons or 
undertakings. The expression ""to that person• ' has been extended, 
by analogy with Article 173 on actions for annulment, to encompass 
• acts that are not addressed to the applicant but concern him 
• 
• 
directly and individually. 3' Even then, it is difficult to imagine 
any action for failure to act brought by an undertaking or a 
private person against the Council that would not be dismissed, 
because the case law of the Court on Article 173 is so strict. 
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Any undertaking or private person seeking the Court's 
assistance against the Council's failure to act is thus in fact 
obliged to use a roundabout approach. The undertaki ng or private 
person must persuade a national court to ref er a question to the 
Court for a preliminary ruling under Article 177. 
There is no such limitation on the right of so-called 
""privileged applicants,'• the Member States and the other 
• Community institutions, to bring an action for failure to act. 
• 
• 
While there are odd examples of actions for failure to act brought 
by a Member State against the Commission, 37 thus far no Member 
State has itself brought an action for failure to act against the 
Council. That might, of course, be explained by the general 
disinclination of the Member States to seek the Court's assistance 
in resolving disputes between them. That disinclination cannot, 
however, explain why the Commission has brought only one action for 
failure to act against the Council. 38 
The restraint of the privileged applicants may therefore be a 
result of the weak effect of a judgment establishing failure to 
act. Whereas a declaration of nullity brings to an end the 
existence of a legal measure challenged, usually even with 
retrospective effect, the failure to act remains as such after a 
judgment pursuant to Article 175. The Court cannot itself 
promulgate the desired legal measure. Under Article 17 6, 3' the 
duty to comply with the judgment supplements the pre-existing duty 
to act found in the judgment. However, it is still up to the 
political authorities to adopt the legal measure in accordance with 
the general rules of legislative procedure. A direction to the 
legislature regarding the detailed content of the legal measure may 
only be ordered if the unfulfilled duty to act is described 
precisely in the EEC Treaty. Due to the Treaty's character as a 
framework instrument, the Treaty will seldom provide such a clear 
description. 
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In reality, the Commission and the Member States have an 
evident interest in an action for failure to act only if the duty 
to act is set out in a clear and unconditional manner in the 
Treaty. Only in such instances can the Court declare obiter that 
the Treaty provision has direct effect regardless of the Council's 
failure to act. f:tfil~a1;rm\lfl!U:~:,:Iae¥!F-~!iJillii!;ttqS,!i!~[iifl!§biJJl::;;11a+~ns 
§l~[f;~a§lltS§"~!;s:1wim1:\tsg'.9~£n:llir&t9;~~1+1B2~;~±~~%~E+ig!f~::::2e~1~:;;i~i&K'2s11:::1 a$s]:::14~ 
g~1~1~&!;211t~1;~9~;~1t~g!29.:<F!if~2~I±;is~;r;s~1!'.11r~m;:t{P.::;::::~n1ii:11:2§£,B!2~:;i~n,1:::1:si2s;ss: 
w&!!±¥:1 ~££S~ii:ismi.t:i:1~;£1Nn;s;1m:±~m;2:¥$iilnl~£:E&1;;,t;;s1ra;na::;;5~s.a~5iit:n&Esi, 
1~'£a2m:;:r1~£e11:e&{ti[:£ge11n~:!¥.:£££££!ILin1;rr.~nt::;~;:::~t.i:rnl§:;l1a£in:f:P:&,=:1ili::1~!&1:nixin'.g 
fisesms::;:2&;:!s~:±x:ti££~s:!~2~:1sasg_;::;~a§::::~;~u1!¥!i¥sa1±_:1:R:1£!f,ee]~!~::::sgs~1ss:t:; 
l:Jl$ili~;eins~!i1i-iiiE:1~¥:;!iE±aa'.}1~9&•&£~~~snm+1:0'.P:it,£&2~;:::;::~a,::::ie£!S111rs!tsrn£~~±a1 
~n~:f'.t~~Q~J.i1B5!t!:!:I!,!1I~!tf§.fi~P.~;l~ii iiiiS9Eit:nl:SY:JijJ;:[~£i\ti.!2§,f;~MB±,§lifili n~:;ili~& 
1~1l:J2r;u:§;i:1:;;tt!sa;lii£~t£JE:ei}irefi2P!&i:~ 1:fil~a1+£&en;::;:1@1~1u:;::::::;:::si:qJ~;;.1e.::::1:::;,~11::::::;:1 il!i; 
ain!!s9!n£eJ£!i~e;::I;aqulsl'=:;1§P:miilJJn~ilitl!¥1t1£1:1;s;9Jili s:~E:stt:ilir~\ n!tI~e~ll:i~1:11is1· 
~1~;z.;~;~ans:!t±::#1;1w:~:rr'§~JktaH!+i!!~ii'li.ne~:;is&;~2:!mlt1s1 11iliei~p,£::::::::,D1:;:::~~!:::1::~:9~2m?Y:s 
B2hE&!iai~:;n;it~{a:t¥~&t+!i]i~StI!JiI~:fii!iii!e;~isnJit~iiilt¥~ -EtME,A~~g1££J@lilt: 
&lt~lE2±1!!e;;Jm:~e!ill!!i1Ei.£i90~-~)rui£ib!?j£~t~¥!~iS~RffEti:e~;f.1L££§,~!!§g£a,1£:!I::E:i2!g 
Ss!ifiEEi'.ilH~iiill i9~&~ilimiifii!1!J::;=1f&?il6'.t 
Apart from the possibility of such obiter dicta, an action for 
• failure to act does not give the Member States or the Commission a 
• 
• 
weapon against the Council's failure to act which is more effective 
than their political means as participants in the legislative 
process or their legal arsenal described above. ~jjlJ:jli!liJHii;Ji,!trnllii!Jli! 
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might have an interest in challenging the Council's failure to act 
in its capacity as budgetary authority by way of an action under 
Article 175. It has in fact done so once, in 1987, when the 
Council did not transmit the budget proposals to the Parliament in 
time.'2 The action brought by the Commission and the corresponding 
action brought by the Parliament43 were regarded by the Court as 
• being devoid of purpose once the Council, albeit after a long 
• 
• 
delay, had fulfilled its duty to act; the actions had nonetheless 
fulfilled their function as a means of exerting pressure. 
The Community institution that has the greatest interest in 
the possibilities of bringing an action for failure to act is the 
Parliament. Even though its political powers have been 
considerably extended in relation to the original treaties, first 
as regards the budget and most recently in the Single European Act 
in legislative matters, it has still not been granted the power to 
initiate action in these areas. The Parliament may thus avail 
itself of its budgetary and legislative powers only if the 
requisite proposal is submitted to it. 
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The Parliament has an even greater interest in the right to 
bring an action for annulment against an act of the Council when 
the Council has not sufficiently considered the Parliament's 
wishes. Although the Parliament now has the last word in the 
budget negotiations, the Council makes the final decisions in the 
legislative area. Even where the Treaty provides for the use of 
the cooperation procedure that was introduced by the Single 
European Act, the most the Parliament can do is to force the 
Council to comply with the requirement of unanimity if the Council 
disagrees with the position of the Parliament. Over the last year 
• the Parliament has therefore fought to win the right to bring an 
• 
• 
The difficulty is that the Parliament is not among the 
institutions mentioned in the first paragraph of Article 17 3, 
conferring the right to bring an action for annulment. During the 
negotiations for the Single European Act, the question whether the 
Parliament should be incorporated into the text was raised, but no 
solution was reached. This rested in part on the ground that the 
Parliament had already raised the question before the Court in the 
so-called ""Comitology'' case." 
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If the ""Comitology'' judgment has met with strong criticism, 
that is primarily because the judgment simultaneously sought to 
• show that the Parliament was not without any legal safeguard 
• 
• 
against the disregard of its prerogatives on the part of the 
Council. The judgment states in particular that as guardian of the 
Treaty, the Commission has the responsibility for ensuring that the 
Parliament's prerogatives are respected and for bringing such 
actions for annulment as might prove necessary. The judgment also 
indicated that the Parliament itself has a right to bring an action 
for failure to act under Article 17 5, which refers to all the 
institutions of the Community. 
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The Parliament did not pursue an action for failure to act, 
but instead persisted in the fresh action for annulment which had 
already been brought before the ""Comitology' ' judgment. The 
• Parliament's course was surely due primarily to the remarks in the 
• 
• 
judgment concerning the Parliament's other legal safeguards. In 
the ""Comitology'' case, the other legal safeguards were actually 
obiter dicta, but they were highly relevant to the new case because 
in the Parliament's view the circumstances clearly showed that the 
other safeguards were inadequate. 
In the ""Comitology' ' case the Parliament had principally 
challenged the content of the Council's measure which differed 
substantially both from the original Commission proposal and from 
the Parliament's suggested amendments. The new case was directed 
against a Council regulation mandating maximum permitted levels of 
radioactive contamination of foodstuffs and of feedingstuff s 
following a nuclear accident. The Parliament challenged the fact 
that the Council, in accordance with the Commission's proposal, had 
based its legal measure on a provision in the Euratom Treaty which 
requires merely that the Parliament be consulted." The Parliament 
argued that the measure should have been based on a provision in 
the EEC Treaty which requires that the more extensive cooperation 
procedure be applied. 
It was clear that the Commission, which agreed with the 
Council on the basis chosen, could not appear as the Parliament's 
champion. Moreover, there was very little sense in bringing an 
action for failure to act against the Council, because the Council 
had already adopted the final act. 
In addition, there was the fact that the Court, in cases 
brought by private plaintiffs, had previously stated that a tacit 
refusal to revoke a legal measure may not be challenged pursuant to 
• Article 175. Such a challenge would constitute a circumvention of 
• 
• 
the restrictions in Article 173. 47 The Court had also held that 
Article 175 is aimed at failure to make a decision, and is not 
directed at the adoption of an act other than that desired by the 
applicant. 0 
In its recent judgment," the Court recognized that the 
""Comitology'' judgment was too uncompromising in its rejection of 
the Parliament's right of action. The Court maintained its view 
that the Parliament is covered by neither the first nor second 
paragraph of Article 173. However, the Court inferred a limited 
right of action pursuant to the Court's duty to ensure observance 
of the institutional balance provided for by the Treaty. This 
principle, however, is limited to cases where the action is 
intended to safeguard the Parliament's special prerogatives. 
Moreover, the action must be based on grounds which relate to the 
alleged disregard of those special prerogatives. Because the case 
before it did in fact lie within those bounds, the Court admitted 
the case for a decision on its merits. 
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an action for failure to act in an appropriate situation as soon as 
the Parliament notices that the Commission is basing its proposal 
on a provision that does not give the Parliament the desired 
influence. However, it is clear that the judgment does diminish 
the Parliament's interest in such a course of action. As stated, 
an action for annulment is an extremely strong weapon and in an 
initial phase, the Parliament will presumably prefer to exercise 
• its political influence, now reinforced by some appropriate legal 
• 
• 
""sabre-rattling.'' 
In sum, it may be stated that the Court's case law has 
developed a range of very effective weapons to be used against the 
Council's failure to act. This has resulted in various forms of 
procedure which, from a superficial reading of the Treaty, might 
appear completely unsuited for the purpose. On the other hand, the 
ostensibly appropriate weapon, the action for failure to act, has 
proved to be so innocuous that it has been largely abandoned in 
favor of those procedures developed later. For a short time, it 
appeared that the action for failure to act might be resuscitated 
as the Parliament's only legal remedy to safeguard its prerogatives 
in the legislative procedure. However, after the most recent 
judgment on this issue, the action for failure to act has also lost 
its real significance as a legal remedy for the Parliament. 
Henceforth the action for failure to act may be primarily regarded 
,,_ 
~.£~~ .. 
1.Mar. 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II), 298 
U.N.T.S. 3 (1958) [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. 
• 4.EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 175. 
• 
• 
• 
5. Id. art. 17 7 • 
~~!~~ll~f~!1!1~~f:?21,,~~¥ap!f¥If~~v1~~i'~¢5~·~;:t~,:1~J'~~~,mai::1~~8D~a~ 
8008. 
Ken: lkdjflk must bluebook this 
8.See Salgoil, Case 13/68, 1968 E.C.R. 453, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCB) 
g 8072. 
9.Van Gend & Loos, Case 26/62, 1963 E.C.R. 1, Common Mkt. Rep. 
(CCB) g 8008. 
10.See Reyners, Case 2/74, 1974 E.C.R. 631, Common Mkt. Rep. 
(CCB) g 8256; Van Binsbergen, Case 33/74, 1974 E.C.R. 1299, Common 
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) g 8282; Charmasson, Case 48/74, 1974 E.C.R. 1383, 
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) g 8291. The transitional period was the 
period within which the Common Market should be established. See 
EEC Treaty, supr a note 1, art. 8. 
II.Becker, Case 8/81, 1982 E.C.R. 53, Common Mkt. Rep. 
8789. 
(CCH) g 
I2.See Rewe-Zentral, Case 120/78, 1979 E.C.R. 649, Common Mkt. Rep. 
(CCB) g 8543. 
I3.EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 30 (regarding measures having 
effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions between Member 
States). 
I4.0.J. L 169/1 (1987), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) g 21,000 • 
• 
• 
• 
17.Council Directive No. 77/388, O.J. L 145/1 (1977), Common Mkt. 
Rep. (CCH) g 9947. 
18.See ORO Amsterdam Beheer, Case 165/89, 1989 E.C.R. 4081. 
19.See Schul, Case 15/81, 1982 E.C.R. 1409, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 
g 8831. 
22.EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 169. 
23.See Commission v. France, Italy and Denmark, Cases 168, 169 & 
171/78, 1980 E.C.R . 347, 385 & 447, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) gg 
8647, 8648 & 8649. 
24.See Commission v. Denmark, Case 106/84, 1986 E.C.R. 833, Common 
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) g 14,315. 
25.See Commission v. United Kingdom, Case 170/78, 1980 E.C.R. 417, 
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) g 8651, case reopened, 1983 E.C.R. 2265. 
27.Black's Law Dictionary defines a negotiorum gestor as, inter 
alia, ""one who, without any mandate or authority, assumes to take 
charge of an affair or concern for another person, in the latter's 
absence, but for his interest.'' Black's Law Dictionary 1036 (6th 
ed. 1990). 
28.See Commission v. United Kingdom, Case 804/79, 1981 E.C.R. 1045, 
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) g 8752 • 
• 
• 
• 
29.See Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Commission, Case 326/85, 1987 
E.C.R. 5091; see also Pluimveeslachterij, Joined Cases 47 & 48/83, 
1984 E.C.R. 1721, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) g 14,087 (offering 
possible suggestion that Commission is entitled to act on ground of 
necessity). 
30.EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 173. 
32.See, ~' Commission v. Council, Case 45/86, 1987 E.C.R. 1493; 
cf. United Kingdom v. Council, Case 68/86, 1988 E.C.R. 855, Common 
Mkt. Rep. (CCB) g 14,475 (known as the Hormones judgment and 
brought by Member State); United Kingdom v. Council, Case 131/86, 
1988 E.C.R. 905, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCB) g 14,494 (known as the 
Battery Hens judgment and brought by Member State). 
33.EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 175. 
34.See, e.g., Holtz and Willemsen v. Council, Case 134/73, 1974 
E.C.R. 1, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCB) g 8255 (known as the Holtz and 
Willemsen I judgment). 
37.See, ~' Germany v. Commission, Case 84/82, 1984 E.C.R. 
1451, Conunon Mkt. Rep. (CCB) g 14,090; Germany v. Commission, 
Case 44/81, 1982 E.C.R. 1855, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCB) g 8,839 
(attempting to invent non-existent action for payment); Aster is and 
Others and Hellenic Republic v. Commission, Joined Cases 97, 99, 
193 & 215/86, 1988 E.C.R. 2181, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCB) g 14,502 
(holding that action for failure to act was changed to action for 
annulment of earlier express decision that refused to issue desired 
measure). 
38.See Commission v. Council, Case 383/87, 1988 E.C.R. 4051. 
39.EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 176 • 
• 
• 
42.See Commission v. Council, Case 383/87, 1988 E.C.R. 4051. 
43.See Parliament v. Council, Case 377/87, 1988 E.C.R. 4017. 
44.Parliament v. Council, Case 302/87, 1988 E.C.R. 5615, Common 
Mk.t. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 2 CEC 139 • 
46.Euratom Treaty, s upra note 2, art. 31. 
47 .See Eridania v. Commission, Joined Cases 10 & 18/68, 1969 
E.C.R. 459, Common Mkt. Rep. g 8,099. 
48.See Deutscher Komponistenverband v. Commission, Case 8/71, 1971 
E.C.R. 705, Common Mk.t. Rep. (CCH) g 8, 143; Irish Cement v. 
Commission, Joined Cases 166-220/86, 1988 E.C.R. 6973. 
49.See Parliament v. Council, Case 70/88 (Judgment of May 22, 
1990), 1990 E.C.R. l (known as the ""Post Tchernobyl-judgment'') • 
